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Abstract: China’s economic transformation and new growth pattern have significant implications for energy demand and 
greenhouse gas emissions. Using an extended version of a large computable general equilibrium model of China, we 
explore alternative futures for the Chinese economy and its energy needs over the period from 2015 to 2030. The simulation 
results show that encouraging household consumption and accelerating economic transition from investment-led to service-
led growth will boost China’s economic growth. Capping coal consumption will improve China’s energy consumption 
structure and reduce greenhouse gas emissions significantly. The simulation exercises imply that, with a well-designed 
policy, the Chinese government can meet the challenges of strong economic growth, lower carbon emissions, environmental 
benefits, and energy security. Moreover, the Chinese government’s goal of peaking carbon emissions at 2030 is achievable. 
Keywords: Dynamic computable general equilibrium model, Economic transition, Energy demand, Greenhouse gas 
emissions, Economic effects.
1 Introduction
China’s rapid economic growth during the last four 
decades has been accompanied by strong growth in energy 
demand and increasing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. 
Fig. 1 (left panel) shows that by 1994, China’s energy 
consumption had doubled from 0.4 billion tonnes of oil 
equivalent (toe) in 1979. After 1994, growth in China’s 
energy demand increased significantly. By 2014, energy 
consumption had reached nearly 7.5 toe. Interestingly, up 
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to 2010, energy consumption and CO2 emissions followed 
similar upward paths. However, after 2010, growth in CO2 
emissions started to decline relative to growth in energy 
demand. (Carbon intensity is the amount of carbon dioxide 
generated (in metric tonnes) per unit of energy consumed 
(in million toe).) In terms of CO2 intensity (emissions 
per unit of energy consumption), China experienced a 
mild decline up to 2014 (see Fig. 1, right panel). By 2014, 
China’s carbon intensity was 3.3 per cent, down from 
previous levels, but still significantly higher than that of the 
rest of the world.
One reason for the high CO2 intensity in China is its 
energy structure, which is dominated by coal. In 2014, China 
consumed about 3 billion toe of coal, which comprised 66 
per cent of China’s total primary energy consumption. This 
was 10 percentage points higher than India, 38 percentage 
points higher than Japan, and 46 percentage points higher 
Scan for more details
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than the United States (see Fig. 2). Concerns for self-
sufficiency and energy security have also led to high levels 
of coal usage and high rates of production from domestic 
resources. Coal self-sufficiency, as measured by the ratio 
of domestic coal production to consumption, was 94 per 
cent in 2014. Although countries such as Indonesia and the 
United States are completely self-sufficient with respect to 
coal supply and are net exporters, coal accounts for a much 
smaller share of their total primary energy consumption 
because large volumes of other fossil fuel resources are 
available.
Despite the concern for self-sufficiency, coal’s share 
of China’s total energy consumption has fallen gradually 
from 87 per cent in the mid-1960s to 66 per cent in 2014, 
with increasing shares of natural gas and renewables in the 
primary energy mix, particularly since 2000 (see Fig. 3). 
Furthermore, coal has played a dominant role in China’s 
electricity generation. In 2014, coal accounted for 72 per 
cent of the electricity generation mix, although it had 
declined from 81 per cent in 2007. Despite this relative 
decline, the total electricity output generated by coal 
increased from 2.7 trillion kWh in 2007 to 4 trillion kWh in 
2014. Moreover, electricity generation accounted for more 
than 50 per cent of China’s total CO2 emissions from fuel 
combustion. 
With this as background, in this paper, we use an 
extended version of a large computable general equilibrium 
model of China (called CHINAGEM) to explore alternative 
CO2 = carbon dioxide; mt = metric tonnes; mtoe = million tonnes of oil equivalent
Source: [1] and authors’ calculations.
Fig. 1 Relationships between energy consumption and CO2 emissions and carbon intensity in China, 1979–2014
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Fig. 2 Total coal consumption and coal dependency for selected countries, 2014
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
m
to
e
500
0
Ch
ina US Ind
ia
Jap
an
Ge
rm
an
y
S. 
Ko
rea UK
Ind
on
esi
a
S. 
Af
ric
a
Au
str
ali
a
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Pe
r c
en
t
Ch
ina Ind
ia
Jap
an
Ge
rm
an
y
S. 
Ko
rea UKUS
Ind
on
esi
a
S. 
Af
ric
a
Au
str
ali
a
mtoe = million tonnes of oil equivalent; UK = United Kingdom; US = United States
Source: [1] and authors’ calculations
Coal dependencyCoal consumption
Global Energy Interconnection Vol. 1 No. 4 Oct. 2018
430
futures for the Chinese economy and its energy needs. 
We report the results for five scenarios, starting in 2014 
and ending in 2030. 
The first scenario is a baseline. The baseline is based 
on business-as-usual assumptions for China’s development 
and is the control scenario against which the alternative 
scenarios are compared.
The four alternative scenarios and their policies are as 
follows.
•   Scenario 1 – accelerating the economic transition 
(increasing the share of the service sector in the 
economy). In this scenario, China’s future growth is 
driven more by consumption and less by investment. 
Included in this scenario is an increasing secular trend 
towards the use of gas (away from coal) for heating in 
household consumption. 
•   Scenario 2 – capping coal consumption by 2020. In 
this scenario, China’s policy makers impose a cap on 
coal consumption after 2020. This policy is currently 
under consideration in China. 
•   Scenario 3 – accelerating unconventional gas production. 
In this scenario, there is a significantly increased 
investment in unconventional gas production facilities 
in China, reflecting current concerns that China is and 
will be relying too much on imported gas.
•   Scenario 4 – The policies of Scenarios 1, 2, and 3 
combined.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 
2 we provide some more background to the current energy 
situation in China. An overview of the modelling framework 
used in the analysis is given in Section 3. Section 4 presents 
the baseline scenario, while Section 5 discusses the policy 
scenarios and simulation results. Section 6 summarizes the 
key findings and concludes the paper. 
2  Economic transition and a new energy policy 
China’s policy makers are facing trade-offs between 
energy security, cost, and environmental outcomes, 
particularly CO2 emissions reductions, as shown in Fig. 4. 
These trade-offs comprise the “energy policy trilemma” [2], 
which describes the challenge of simultaneously achieving 
energy security, access to affordable energy service, and 
environmentally sensitive production and use within an 
economy. (https://www.worldenergy.org/work-programme/
strategic-insight/assessment-of-energy-climate-change-
policy/) 
The World Energy Council publishes the Energy 
Trilemma Index, which ranks countries in terms of their 
likely ability to provide sustainable energy policies. Countries 
are scored on the three dimensions of the energy trilemma:
•   Energy security: the effective management of primary 
energy supplies from both domestic and external 
sources, the reliability of the energy infrastructure, 
and the ability of participating energy firms to meet 
current and future demands.
•   Energy equity: the accessibility and affordability of 
energy across the population.
•   Environmental sustainability: the achievement of 
supply- and demand-side energy efficiencies and the 
development of energy supplies from renewable and 
other low-carbon sources.
Note: Other types of fuels include solar, wind, geothermal, and biofuel-based energy.
Source: [1] and authors’ calculations
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On the Energy Trilemma Index Ranking (Table 1), 
China’s energy security is relatively strong (ranked 21st). 
However, environmental sustainability remains a challenge 
(China is ranked 129th in the world for environmental 
impact mitigation).
Table 1 Energy Trilemma Index ranks for  
selected countries, 2015
Country 
Total 
rank
Energy 
security
Energy 
equity
Environmental 
mitigation
India 107 53 104 122
China 74 21 79 129
Brazil 37 43 78 17
Japan 32 83 19 49
Australia 17 6 14 110
Germany 13 25 46 44
United 
States
12 3 1 95
Canada 7 1 2 71
Source: [3]
Several main factors have combined to change China’s 
economic growth pattern: increasing air pollution and 
decades of other environmental debts [4], rapid demographic 
transition and decreasing growth in China’s population 
caused by the one-child policy [5,6,7,8], and poor economic 
performance in major Western economies and accumulation 
of current account imbalances [9]. China’s economic growth 
pattern has changed 
•   from export-oriented growth to domestic consumption-
driven growth; 
•   from capital intensive, industry-led growth to a growth 
that is balanced between investment and consumption; 
and 
•   from high mineral and energy-intense growth to “green 
development.” 
A green development strategy seeks to combine 
continued rapid growth with ambitious targets for energy 
efficiency, natural resource management, and environmental 
sustainability. This reorientation of China’s growth pattern 
has significant implications for its energy demands. 
First, a growth that is balanced between investment and 
consumption implies a faster growth of service industries 
and a rising share of consumption in GDP expenditure. 
Second, the goals of energy efficiency, low carbon emission, 
and environmental sustainability will slow the increase in 
(or even reduce) the demand for coal while augmenting the 
increase in the demand for gas and other clean energy. 
From 2000 to 2014, China’s gas consumption showed 
a seven-fold increase with a compound annual growth rate 
(CAGR) of more than 15 per cent (see Fig. 5). During the 
same period, China’s gas production increased five-fold, 
with a CAGR of around 12 per cent. The slow growth of 
gas production with respect to gas consumption has led to 
increasing gas imports. China began importing liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) in 2006. Imports of pipeline natural gas 
from Central Asia began in 2010, followed by imports from 
Myanmar in 2013. In 2014, pipeline gas imports accounted 
for 53 per cent of the total imports of natural gas. Import 
dependency has increased from 2 per cent in 2007 to around 
30 per cent in 2014. China was the world’s third largest 
LNG importer and the world’s sixth largest importer of 
pipeline gas in 2014. 
Using a dynamic general equilibrium approach, this 
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study investigates how changes in China’s economic growth 
pattern affect its energy demand, especially for natural gas 
and LNG imports. 
3 Modelling framework
3.1 CHINAGEM 
The standard version of CHINAGEM consists of 137 
sectors. However, for this study, we incorporated a climate 
change module that also includes energy accounting and 
carbon emission accounting. The extended CHINAGEM 
model includes 143 sectors with 2007 database. The core 
CGE structure of CHINAGEM is based on ORANI, a 
static CGE model of the Australian economy [10], and 
the dynamic mechanisms of CHINAGEM are based on 
the MONASH model of the Australian economy [11]. 
CHINAGEM captures three types of dynamic links: 
physical capital accumulation, financial asset/liability 
accumulation, and lagged adjustment processes in the labor 
market. 
In CHINAGEM, production is modelled using nested 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) and Leontief 
production functions, which allow substitution between 
domestic and imported sources of produced inputs (the 
Armington assumption) and between labour, capital, and 
land (see Fig. 7). The production functions assume constant 
returns to scale. Household demand is modelled by the 
linear expenditure system. Trade is modelled using the 
Armington assumption for import demand and a constant 
elasticity of transformation for export supply. China is 
treated as a large economy in the import markets for some 
commodities whose Chinese import shares comprise over 
10 per cent of the world market. Changes in China’s imports 
for these commodities are allowed to affect world prices. 
For the remaining commodities, foreign import prices are 
determined in world markets in isolation from developments 
in China. Chinese exporters are assumed to face downward-
sloping world demand schedules. 
3.2 Energy extensions of CHINAGEM
The original version of CHINAGEM lacks the capacity 
to model energy issues in detail. In this version, primary 
energy is supplied by only two industries: the coal industry 
and a composite crude-oil and gas industry. There are also 
two secondary energy industries, which produce refined oil 
products and electricity. 
For this study, we modified CHINAGEM to enable 
more detailed energy modeling. Specifically, we 
•   split the crude oil and gas industry into two separate 
industries;
•   disaggregated domestic gas production into separate 
conventional and unconventional gas producers; 
•   identified two sources of imported natural gas - 
pipeline gas and LNG;
•   disaggregated electricity generation across six unique 
fuel technologies - coal, gas, oil, nuclear, hydro, and 
other renewables and introduced inter-fuel substitution 
into electricity generation;
•   made allowance for cost-responsive changes in the 
relative supplies of conventional and unconventional 
gas; and 
•   defined price-responsive substitution mechanisms that 
allow for substitution between pipeline gas and LNG 
demands.
3.2.1 Disaggregation of oil and gas
The initial database represents crude oil and gas 
production as a single industry producing a single product. 
We separate this industry into three parts: crude oil, 
conventional gas, and unconventional gas. We also separate 
the single commodity into crude oil and gas. The crude oil 
industry produces only crude oil and is the only domestic 
industry that does so. The two gas industries each produce a 
single product (gas) and are the only domestic industries that 
do so. Oil and gas are also imported. For each commodity, 
total supply equals domestic production plus imports. 
3.2.2  Cost-responsive changes in the relative 
supplies of conventional and unconventional 
gas
By introducing a two-industry structure for gas supply, 
we provide the model with the means to implement cost-
responsive changes in relative supplies. This is illustrated in 
Fig. 6. 
Initially, the intersection of market supply and demand 
Fig. 6 Cost-responsive changes in the relative supplies of 
        conventional and unconventional gas
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determines the overall quantity of gas supplied (Q) to match 
demand at the market price (P). At this price, the amount 
of unconventional gas supplied is Quncon and the amount of 
conventional gas supplied is Qconv. For example, suppose 
that there is a change in supply brought about by, say, 
a cost-reducing change in the technology for producing 
unconventional gas. As indicated in Fig. 6 by the black 
arrow, this shifts the supply schedule for unconventional 
gas to the right. If the supply schedule for conventional gas 
remains unchanged, there will be a shift to the right in market 
supply. If the market demand schedule remains unchanged, 
this leads to a lower market price and increased overall 
supply. For the total supply, the share of unconventional gas 
supply rises and that of conventional gas falls. 
3.2.3 Two sources of imported gas supply
China’s demand for natural gas is met by domestic 
production and imports. As explained above, domestic gas 
is supplied by conventional and unconventional producers. 
There are two primary sources of the imported supply: 
pipeline gas and shipments of LNG.
To model the two sources of gas imports, we require 
data on expenditure by source of supply for each gas user 
represented in the model. Currently, such data are not 
available for individual users. Accordingly, we use national 
shares to allocate the purchases of imported gas for each 
user to pipeline and LNG sources.
To model the alternative sources of imported gas, we 
assume that pipeline gas is an imperfect substitute for LNG. 
Thus, the landed cost, insurance, and freight (CIF) price of 
pipeline gas can differ from the landed CIF price of LNG, 
and any change in the relative price will lead to a change 
in the ratio of use. This is illustrated in Fig. 7, which shows 
the input structure for gas for a typical gas user in the 
model. At the top level, overall demand for gas is met by 
a combination of domestically produced gas and imported 
gas. The aggregator function has a CES form. As explained 
above, domestic gas can be sourced from conventional and 
unconventional producers. 
The idea that domestically produced gas is an imperfect 
substitute for imported gas is a part of the existing model 
structure. To this, we add a new specification that allows 
for imported gas to be sourced from LNG and pipeline gas. 
Again, the aggregator has a CES form.
3.2.4  Electricity disaggregated by generation 
type and supply
The current CHINAGEM recognizes one electricity 
sector that generates electricity as well as provides services 
associated with its transmission, distribution, and retailing. 
Intermediate inputs to electricity, including fuels, are 
combined in fixed proportions. Accordingly, there is 
no possibility of inter-fuel substitution in the electricity 
generation.
Following Adams and Parmenter [4], we correct this by 
introducing inter-fuel substitution in electricity generation 
using the “technology bundle” approach. In the revised 
model, we split the composite electricity sector into 
generation and supply. Electricity-generating industries 
are distinguished based on the type of fuel used. The end-
use supplier (electricity supply) purchases generation and 
provides electricity to electricity users. When purchasing 
electricity, it can substitute among the different generation 
technologies in response to changes in generation costs. 
Such substitution is price induced, with the elasticity of 
substitution among the technologies typically set at five.
The model distinguishes six types of electricity 
generation. Coal, oil, and gas generation use fossil fuels; 
nuclear generation uses imported nuclear fuel; and hydro 
and other renewable methods of generation rely on 
renewable energy sources. The model treats each type of 
electricity generation as one industry with a unique output, 
such that electricity produced by different fuels may, 
and indeed are likely, to have different prices in different 
scenarios. The electricity generation industries sell only 
to the electricity supply industry. The electricity supply 
industry sources from these electricity generation industries 
according to a CES substitution function (Fig. 8). We set 
the value of the substitution elasticity to five. (If the value 
of the substitution variable is 0, then this effectively creates 
a Leontief production structure. This reflects the fact that 
dispatching orders in China’s electricity market react more 
to administrative orders than price signals. )
Fig. 7 Demand for gas from alternative imported sources
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4 Baseline Scenario
The baseline forecast is a business-as-usual scenario 
for the Chinese economy over the period from 2014 to 
2030. It is constructed on the assumption that there will be 
no changes in government policies beyond those already 
announced. More specifically, for the macro variables, the 
baseline is developed under the assumptions that
(1) the Chinese economy will continue to grow strongly, 
but, following recent trends, overall growth will slowly 
diminish;
(2) the pattern of growth will favor consumption and 
consumption-related industries at the expense of investment 
and investment-related industries;
(3) import growth will exceed export growth; and 
(4) growth in the service sector will exceed growth in 
the industrial sector. 
Table 2 shows the calibrated growth rates of the GDP 
components and three industry groups in the baseline 
scenario. These numbers are used as shocks to CHINAGEM 
under the forecast closure, yielding the assumed growth of 
real GDP for the forecast simulation from 2014 to 2030. 
For the key energy industry assumption in the baseline 
scenario, we use the International Energy Agency 
(IEA)’s current policies scenario from its World Energy 
Outlook 2015, which comprises a suite of cross-cutting 
policies,(Cross-cutting policies refer to policies that have 
multiple impacts.) power-sector policies, and industry-
sector policies (see Table 3). Other assumptions, such as 
lower growth for steel production and higher efficiencies in 
metallurgical coking operations, are also included in Table 3. 
According to the IEA’s current policy scenario [12], 
China’s coal consumption is projected to increase from 2,144 
million toe in 2020 to 2,410 million toe in 2030 (see Fig. 9) 
and the share of coal in the primary energy mix will decline 
from 61.2 per cent in 2020 to 57.5 per cent in 2030. The 
share of gas in the primary energy mix will increase from 7.2 
per cent in 2020 to 8.8 per cent in 2030.
Table 2 Baseline scenario: calibrated growth rate of GDP 
components, industry groups, and other variables (%)
Average annual growth rate
2014 2015–2016 2017–2020 2021–2025 2026–2030
Household 
consumption
8.84 8.37 7.79 7.22 6.64
Investment 7.10 6.72 6.25 5.79 5.33
Government 
consumption
7.70 7.29 6.79 6.28 5.79
Exports 8.17 7.73 7.20 6.67 6.14
Imports 10.15 9.60 8.94 8.28 7.62
Agriculture 3.87 3.88 3.73 3.57 3.40
Industry 8.00 7.61 7.31 7.00 6.68
Services 7.59 8.01 7.70 7.38 7.04
Employment 0.35 –0.21 –0.21 –0.04 -0.29
Population 0.42 0.44 0.44 0.22 0.06
Real GDP 7.40 7.00 6.50 6.00 5.50
GDP = gross domestic product
Source: Employment and population data are from [13], the growth rates 
of the GDP components and three-industry group from 2014 to 2016 are 
from the World Bank’s development indicators, and those from 2017 to 
2030 are the authors’ assumptions. 
Table 3 Key energy and industry assumptions/scenarios for 
baseline forecast
Cross-cutting policy 
assumptions by 
scenario
Power-sector 
policies and 
measures by 
scenario
Industry-sector policies 
and measures by 
scenario
Implementation of 
measures in the 12th 
Five-Year Plan, 
including a 17 per cent 
cut in CO2 intensity by 
2015 and a 16 per cent 
reduction in energy 
intensity by 2015 
compared with 2010.
Increase the share 
of non-fossil fuels 
in primary energy 
consumption to around 
15 per cent by 2020.
Implementation 
of measures in 
the 12th Five-
Year Plan.
290 GW of hydro 
capacity installed 
by 2015.
100 GW of wind 
capacity installed 
by 2015.
35 GW of solar 
capacity installed 
by 2015.
Small plant closures 
and the phasing out of 
outdated production, 
including the 
comprehensive control of 
small coal-fired boilers.
Mandatory adoption of 
coke dry-quenching and 
top-pressure turbines in 
new iron and steel plants. 
Support of non-blast 
furnace iron making.
Three industries - iron 
smelting, steel making 
and steel rolling - are 
assumed to grow at a low 
rate and will stop growth 
from 2020 onwards.  
CO2 = carbon dioxide; GW = gigawatt
Fig. 8 Nested production structure in CHINAGEM model
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In the baseline scenario, China’s gas production will 
continue to grow. Following the IEA, we assume that the 
production of unconventional gas will grow quickly (Fig. 
10). The share of unconventional gas in the domestic gas 
production will increase from less than eight per cent in 
2014 to 39 per cent in 2030. The size of China’s gas imports 
will continue to grow while the shares of pipeline gas and 
LNG, which are around 50% each, will remain roughly the 
same as in 2014.
5 Policy scenarios and simulation results
5.1 Policy scenarios
The aim of a policy simulation is to explore how the 
economy would evolve when subjected to various shocks or 
changes in economic policy relative to the baseline (forecast) 
simulation. For this paper, we report on four policy 
scenarios.
5.1.1  Scenario 1 — faster structural transition by 
increasing the share of the service sector
Scenario 1 models an accelerated economic restructuring 
by increasing the share of the service sector. Specifically, 
we assume that the share of the service sector in GDP will 
be about 5 per cent higher in 2030 than it is in the baseline 
scenario (see Table 4). 
The reasons for assuming a faster increase in the share 
of service sector than in the baseline scenario are as follows. 
(1) China is relying more on domestic consumption rather 
than the investment to drive growth and consumption has 
a higher service share. (2) Urbanization can be an indirect 
mtoe = million tonnes of oil equivalent; TWh = terawatt hours
Source: [12] for China’s current policies.
Note: The Current Policies Scenario assumes no changes in policies from the mid-point of 
the year of publication (i.e., from about June).
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driver of consumption growth [14]. According to the UN’s 
World Urbanization Prospects, China’s urbanization rate 
will increase from 56 per cent in 2015 to 61 per cent in 2020 
and then to 71 per cent in 2030 [15]. (3) China’s sustained 
growth in income will stimulate service demand growth. 
According to the World Bank, the demand for services is 
rising as income increases because people are becoming 
less concerned about material needs. For households, this 
leads to an increasing demand for services such as health, 
education, and entertainment services. In the business 
sector, companies recognize that many activities can be 
handled more efficiently by a service provider. These 
activities include sales and marketing, accounting, 
technology, service delivery, management, human 
resources, and finance.
To implement this scenario, the share of the service sector 
is treated as an exogenous variable. The targeted trajectory 
for the services share is imposed via endogenous (model-
determined) changes in the average propensity to consume 
(APC). (Consumption is oriented towards service sectors. 
Thus, an increase in the average propensity to consume, all 
else unchanged, will lead to increased consumption and a 
shift in the economy towards services production.) We also 
assume the following. 
•   Household preferences will shift towards service 
goods. As Chinese consumers become wealthier, 
they will spend more money on service products such 
as education, communication, travel, and finance 
services. We assume that if prices and income remain 
at their baseline values, then Chinese consumers will 
increase the share of services in their overall budget 
by 5 per cent per year. (This number is calibrated at a 
rate which would be required to increase the service 
share in consumption from the current level in China 
to a level consistent with the Australian share of 
services in household consumption at the similar 
income level.)
•   Household preference for gas will be higher than 
in the baseline scenario. As their income increases, 
households can afford and are more likely to choose 
cleaner energy, e.g., gas rather than coal. Moreover, 
rapid urbanization means that more people will live 
in the city, where people normally consume more gas 
than coal. The calibration of this shock is based on 
the subjective judgement that urbanization will reduce 
household consumption of coal by 2030 by around 80 
per cent compared with baseline levels. (This shift is 
calibrated such that, initially, the household sector’s 
use of energy does not change, only the mix of that 
energy (i.e. towards gas and away from coal).)
Table 4 Comparison of economic structures of the baseline 
and Scenario 1
Year Agriculture Industry Service
Baseline
Scenario 
1
Baseline
Scenario 
1
Baseline
Scenario 
1
2015 9.0 8.9 45.8 45.8 45.2 45.3
2020 7.7 7.2 44.6 43.7 47.7 49.2
2025 6.6 5.7 42.9 40.6 50.6 53.7
2030 5.6 4.5 40.7 36.9 53.7 58.6
Source: CHINAGEM baseline and policy simulations.
5.1.2  Scenario 2—stronger action to limit coal 
consumption using a cap on total coal 
consumption by 2020
China is seeking to cap coal consumption at a maximum 
of 5 billion metric tons of standard coal equivalent by 2020. 
This cap was contained in the Five-Year Plan for 2016 to 
2020, which was released in March 2016. To achieve this 
cap by 2020, we assume that the growth rate of primary 
coal consumption will gradually decline from 2015 to zero 
after 2020. Meanwhile, we allow the coal-use efficiency to 
improve for industries using coal as an input. Capping coal 
consumption will reduce the share of coal in the primary 
energy and electricity generation mixes, and the CO2 
intensity (i.e., CO2 emissions per unit of energy consumed).
5.1.3  Scenario 3—higher unconventional gas 
production
Scenario 3 models the effect of an increase in unconventional 
gas production using the IEA New Policies Scenario for 
China as a guide [12]. The increase in unconventional gas 
production is achieved by improving the technology in 
the unconventional gas sector through investments in gas 
infrastructure as well as unconventional gas exploration and 
production.
5.1.4 Scenario 4—a composite scenario
Scenario 4 integrates all the assumptions in Scenarios 1, 
2, and 3.
5.2 Policy results analysis
5.2.1  Macroeconomic effect of the various policy 
scenarios
Table 5 displays the deviations of macroeconomic 
variables for each of the different policy scenarios from the 
baseline case. By the end of the simulation period (2030), 
the real GDP in Scenario 1 is nearly 7 per cent higher than 
that of the baseline, whereas it is almost one per cent lower 
in Scenario 2 and there is almost no change in Scenario 3. 
The combined shocks of the three policies result in a higher 
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real GDP in Scenario 4. As Table 5 shows, the higher GDP 
(5 per cent higher than that of the baseline) in Scenario 4 
is mainly driven by the policy in Scenario 1, which is to 
accelerate the change in economic structure with a higher 
share of service sectors in the GDP.
The remaining commentary on macroeconomic effects 
focusses on the results for Scenario 1.
The higher share of the service sector in the GDP in 
our model is achieved by encouraging households to spend 
more and save less, with spending shifted towards service 
goods. Because service sectors are more labour intensive 
than the industry and agricultural sectors, the increase in 
household spending stimulates the development of service 
sectors and creates more employment opportunities than 
would occur in the baseline scenario. By 2030, employment 
is projected to be nearly 5 per cent higher in Scenario 1 than 
in the baseline. The positive correlation between capital 
and labour means that the growth in employment drives 
up the growth of the capital stock if all else being equal. 
Apart from employment growth, there is one more factor 
that stimulates the capital stock growth: the improvement 
of terms of trade (discussed in the next paragraph). The 
simulation results show that capital stock will be 10 per cent 
higher than in the base scenario. Higher employment and 
capital increases the real GDP. 
Table 5 Macroeconomic effect of the policy simulations in 2030
(cumulative deviation from the baseline scenario %)
Variables Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Real GDP 6.99 -0.99 0.0 5.07
Capital stock 10.2 -0.26 -0.03 9.37
Employment 4.8 -0.37 0.05 3.94
Real wages 6.4 -0.78 -0.16 4.82
Investment 15.6 -1.26 0.22 13.8
Real 
household 
consumption
21.1 -0.56 -0.06 18.9
Exports -24.8 0.33 -0.37 -24.3
Imports 15.1 0.89 -0.31 15.6
Terms of 
trade 7.32 0.25 -0.23 7.56
Source: CHINAGEM simulation results.
On the expenditure side of GDP, the increased real 
GDP is absorbed primarily by increased real household 
consumption. By the end of 2030, real household 
consumption will be more than 20 per cent higher than in 
the baseline scenario.
It is assumed that government consumption is linked 
to household consumption. Thus, the percentage change in 
government consumption matches the percentage change in 
household consumption.
The increase in capital (relative to baseline levels) 
requires an increase in investment. If consumption (C + 
G) and investment (I) increase by more than the real GDP 
(Y),  the balance of  trade (X − M) must deteriorate. The 
mechanism is the real appreciation of the Chinese RMB, 
which increases imports and reduces exports. Table 5 shows 
that imports will be 15 per cent higher and exports will 
be nearly 25 per cent lower than in the baseline scenario. 
For exports, we assume that China faces downward-
sloping foreign demand curves for the majority of its 
exportable goods. Thus, the contraction in exports causes an 
improvement in the terms of trade (7.3 per cent higher). 
The improvement in terms of trade increases the GDP 
deflator relative to the price of domestic final demand (the 
average price deflator of consumption and investment). This 
is because the GDP deflator includes the price of exports 
and excludes the price of imports, where the opposite is true 
for the price of the final domestic demand. In the long run, 
the rate of return on capital in China will be little affected 
by the shocks associated with each of the policy scenarios. 
Thus, with the rental price of capital (the numerator in the 
rate of return) moving with the price of investment (the 
denominator), improvements in the terms of trade tends 
to reduce the rental price of capital relative to the price 
of the GDP. In other words, in the final few years of the 
simulation, there is a fall in the real cost of capital for 
the economy. At this time, as employment increases and 
technology remains fixed, the reduction in the real cost of 
capital causes the economy-wide ratio of capital to labour 
to rise. This leads to a percentage increase in capital that is 
larger than the percentage increase in employment. 
By the end of the simulation period, the real wage rate 
is projected to be 6 per cent higher than in the baseline (see 
Table 5). 
Note that in Scenario 2, capping coal consumption 
without other compensating policies will slightly harm the 
macro economy with a real GDP that is almost one per 
cent lower in 2030 than in the baseline. (This will occur 
because capping coal consumption will increase the cost 
of the downstream industries that use coal as intermediate 
input and therefore reduce their output. Because most coal-
using industries are capital intensive, the contraction of 
these industries will reduce the demand for capital. The 
decline of capital stock will drive the demand for labour 
down. Employment is hence 0.37 per cent lower than in 
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the baseline. The lower employment combined with lower 
capital stock hence creates a lower GDP growth in Scenario 
2.) However, capping coal consumption will improve 
China’s energy consumption structure and reduce carbon 
emission significantly (Table 8), which we discuss in the 
next section. 
The natural gas industry has grown rapidly in recent 
years as a result of the government’s effort towards green 
development; however, its share of the whole economy is 
still very low, only 0.5 per cent in 2014. Even though there 
is a large investment increase in the unconventional gas 
sector to promote its production, the effect of this policy on 
the macro economy is very small (Table 5). 
5.2.2  Effects on China’s energy structure and 
carbon emissions
Table 6 displays the simulation results of the primary 
energy mix, electricity generation mix, and carbon emissions 
for the various policy scenarios. Scenario 2 (capping coal 
consumption) has a relatively large effect on China’s 
energy consumption structure. With the cap in place from 
2020, the share of coal consumption is projected to reduce 
significantly to 52.7 per cent in 2030 (compared with 60.3 
per cent in the baseline). Meanwhile, the shares of natural 
gas and alternative fuels will increase. Furthermore, the 
share of coal-generated electricity will drop significantly to 
around 54.4 per cent, which is nearly 10 percentage points 
less than that of the baseline. A further consequence of this 
policy is a reduction in CO2 emissions and carbon intensity. 
(This study does not explicitly examine how introducing a 
tax on coal and energy pricing will affect the coal share in 
the primary energy mix and CO2 emissions. The revenues 
from a coal tax could partly be applied towards clean energy 
development, with a higher potential for fueling economic 
growth [16]. China introduced an emissions trading scheme 
in 2017 covering the power sector and heavy industry. 
This scheme will help curb the appetite for coal, and lead 
to a slowing growth and then reduction in China’s CO2 
emissions around 2030 [12]. Nevertheless, taxes and price 
will influence investment decisions regarding coal and other 
alternative fuels. ) 
Table 6 shows that, by 2030, coal-based carbon 
emissions will be 2.7 billion tonnes lower than that of the 
baseline, and natural gas-based carbon emissions will be 
0.1 billion tonnes higher than that of the baseline. The 
small increase in CO2 emissions from gas reflects strong 
substitutions among coal, gas, and renewables. As a result, 
CO2 emissions are 19 per cent lower and carbon intensity is 
eight per cent lower than the baseline by 2030. 
In Scenario 1, increasing household consumption and 
household preference for gas (relative to baseline levels) 
results in slightly higher economy-wide shares of gas and 
non-fossil fuels by the end of the projection period. The 
cleaner energy consumption structure reduces the carbon 
emissions. Table 6 shows that in 2020 in Scenario 1, total 
CO2 emissions are 0.2 billion tonnes lower than in the 
baseline scenario. This lowers carbon intensity by around 
one percentage point.
Table 6 Energy demand and carbon emissions in 2030 (%)
Baseline
Scenario 
1
Scenario 
2
Scenario 
3
Scenario 
4
Total energy consumption 
Primary energy mix (%)
Coal 60.3 58.9 52.7 60.3 51.1
Gas 7.5 8.1 10.5 7.9 10.7
Oil 17.6 17.0 19.9 17.5 18.5
Non-fossil 
fuel
14.6 16.0 16.9 14.3 19.7
Electricity generation mix (%)
Coal 63.9 63.7 54.4 63.8 49.7
Gas 5.0 4.8 6.7 5.1 6.7
Oil 0 0 0 0 0
Non-fossil 
fuel
31.1 31.4 38.9 31.1 43.5
Carbon Emissions (billion tonnes)
Coal 10.7 10.5 8.0 10.7 8.1
Gas 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8
Petrol 
refinery
2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
Total 13.6 13.4 11.0 13.7 11.2
Source: CHINAGEM baseline and policy simulations.
The effects of Scenario 3 (increasing unconventional 
gas production) on China’s energy structure are relatively 
small. This is because the share of gas (conventional and 
unconventional) is small relative to that of other forms of 
primary energy and because the increase in unconventional 
gas tends to reduce the use of conventional gas, leaving 
overall gas consumption relatively stable. The reduction of 
conventional gas in Scenario 3 is a result of the increased 
competition between conventional and unconventional gas 
whereas the increased investment improves the technology 
of unconventional gas production and reduces its cost. 
When all scenarios are combined, we find that by 
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2030, there will be significant changes away from coal in 
China’s energy needs and significant reductions in CO2 
emissions (see Table 6 and Fig. 11). The share of coal in 
the primary energy mix will be reduced to 51 per cent in 
2030 compared with 60.3 per cent in the baseline scenario, 
while the consumption of natural gas and non-fossil fuels 
will increase substantially. The share of non-fossil fuels 
will increase to 20 per cent, which reaches the goal that 
the Chinese government set in its Intended Nationally 
Determined Contribution. (On 30 June 2015, China 
submitted its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution. 
China has promised to increase the share of non-fossil fuels 
in primary energy consumption to around 20 per cent [17].) 
In the electricity generation mix, the share of coal-generated 
electricity will decline to below 50 per cent in 2030. Gas 
remains a minor input, growing to only 6.7 per cent by 
2030. China will gradually come to rely on non-fossil fuels 
to provide its electricity. Non-fossil fuels will generate nearly 
43.5 per cent of China’s electricity in 2030, which is nearly 
40 per cent higher than that of the baseline (31.1 per cent). 
The change of China’s energy structure will affect 
its carbon emissions profoundly. Fig. 12 shows that, in 
Scenario 4, total CO2 emissions grow very slowly from 2020 
to 2030, with 0.4 per cent CAGR, compared with around 
2 per cent in the baseline scenario over the same period. 
As a result, by 2030, total CO2 emissions in Scenario 4 are 
11.2 billion tonnes, which is 2.4 billion tonnes below the 
emissions in the baseline (13.6 billion tonnes). With a slow 
annual growth rate, total carbon emissions come very close 
to peaking by 2030, in line with commitments from the 
Chinese government. (In its Intended Nationally Determined 
Contribution, China has promised to achieve peak emissions 
by 2030 and would make their best effort to peak early [17]. 
The simulated results also show that, among the total 
CO2 emissions, coal emissions reduce to 8.1 billion tonnes 
in 2030 compared with 10.7 billion tonnes in the baseline, 
which is a reduction of 24 per cent (Table 6 and Fig. 12). 
The slow growth of carbon emissions in the composite 
policy of Scenario 4 will also improve China’s carbon 
intensity. The carbon intensity will be 10 per cent lower 
than in the baseline case. 
5.2.3 Effects on China’s natural gas production and import 
Fig. 13 displays the simulation results of China’s natural 
gas consumption under the various policy scenarios. Natural 
gas consumption in all four policy scenarios is higher than 
in the baseline. As outlined already, the reasons are as 
follows: the changes in household consumption towards 
natural gas, the substitution of gas for coal, and a reduction 
of gas cost because of technological improvements in 
unconventional gas production. (Given the current state of 
unconventional gas production technology in China, there 
is significant scope for productivity gains over time. Any 
productivity improvement lowers the unit cost of production 
and increases the competitiveness of unconventional 
gas in the national gas market. As the competitiveness 
of unconventional gas improves, so does its share in the 
national market. Hence, in Scenario 3, there is an increase in 
unconventional gas production relative to conventional gas 
production.) 
China’s natural gas imports are expected to expand to 
meet the continually increasing gas demand. Table 7 shows 
that natural gas imports are higher in both Scenarios 1 and 
Fig. 11 Primary energy mix and electricity generation mix in Scenario 4, 2015–2030
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2. By contrast, the changes considered in Scenario 3 lead to 
increased consumption of domestically produced gas at the 
expense of imports. The increasing demand for natural gas 
after combining all the scenarios together drives China’s 
gas imports up dramatically. Figure 13 shows that total gas 
demand in scenario 4 will be 606.7 billion cubic meters 
(bcm) in 2030, which is 29 per cent higher than that of the 
baseline scenario (469.8 bcm). As discussed in Section 1, 
China’s gas imports consist of LNG and pipeline gas. Fig. 14 
shows that LNG and pipeline gas imports will increase 
significantly in Scenario 4 compared with the baseline. As 
a result, China’s import dependency for natural gas would 
increase from 32.6 per cent to 38.1 per cent (Table 7). 
Fig. 12 Changes in carbon emissions: Scenario 4 vs baseline, 2015–2030
Increasing trend of carbon emissions Carbon emissions, by fuel type, 2030
Note: China commenced its LNG imports in 2006 and pipeline gas imports in 2010. 
Source: CHINAGEM baseline and policy simulations.
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Fig. 13 Total gas consumption by 2030 for various 
policy scenarios
bcm = billion cubic meters; LNG = liquefied natural gas
Source: CHINAGEM baseline and policy simulations.
Fig. 14 Comparison of natural gas imports in Scenario 4 vs the baseline, 2010–2030
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Table 7 Natural gas consumption, production, and imports 
in China in 2030 (bcm)
Baseline
Scenario 
1
Scenario 
2
Scenario 
3
Scenario 
4
Consumption 469.84 504.28 585.83 502.56 606.65
Production 316.77 331.08 371.94 367.54 375.56
Imported 153.07 173.2 213.89 135.02 231.09
LNG 72.29 81.8 101.02 63.77 109.14
Import 
dependency 
32.6 41.3 36.5 26.9 38.1
bcm =billion cubic meters
Source: CHINAGEM baseline and policy simulations.
6 Conclusions
China’s economic growth pattern is changing. Using 
a dynamic computable general equilibrium model of the 
Chinese economy, in this paper, we explore the effects of 
alternative economic growth patterns on China’s energy 
demand, particularly the demand for natural gas. We present 
the results of five scenarios: the baseline (business-as-usual 
scenario), Scenario 1 (accelerating economic transition 
by increasing share of the service sector in the economy), 
Scenario 2 (capping coal consumption by 2020), Scenario 3 
(accelerating unconventional gas production), and Scenario 
4 (a composite scenario of Scenarios 1 to 3).
The simulation results show the following. 
•   Encouraging household consumption and accelerating 
economic transition from investment-led to service led 
growth will boost China’s economic growth. 
•   Capping coal consumption without other compensating 
policies will slightly harm the macro economy. 
However, capping coal consumption will improve 
China’s energy consumption structure and reduce 
carbon emission significantly.
•   Investment in non-conventional gas will reduce the 
production cost of domestic natural gas and increase 
the competition between conventional and non-
conventional gas. 
•   Combining all the three policies together will not only 
boost China’s economic growth but also improve 
China’s energy consumption structure. The model 
shows that in 2030, the share of coal consumption in 
the primary energy mix will reduce to 51 per cent, 
the share of natural gas will increase to 11 per cent, 
and the share of non-fossil fuels will increase to 
20 per cent;
•   Natural gas imports will grow faster to meet the 
increase in natural gas demand, which will cause the 
import dependency to rise to 38 per cent in 2030.
•   China’s total carbon emissions will reduce substantially, 
especially if coal consumption is capped. 
These simulations imply that with a well-designed 
policy, the Chinese government can meet the challenge 
of strong economic growth, lower carbon emissions, 
environmental benefits, and energy security. Moreover, the 
Chinese government’s goal of peaking carbon emissions by 
2030 is achievable. Accelerating economic transition and 
capping coal consumption are the keys to achieving these 
goals.
References
[1] British Petrol (BP) (2015) Statistical review of world energy 
2015, BP
[2] Wensley S., Wilson S., Kuang J. (2013), “China’s energy demand 
growth and the energy policy trilemma”, China Update 2014. 
World Bank, Washington D. C., USA
[3] World Energy Council (2015), 2015 Energy Trilemma Index: 
benchmarking the sustainability of national energy systems, 
WEC, London, UK
[4] Adams P. D., Parmenter B. R. (2013), “Computable General 
Equilibrium Modelling of Environmental Issues in Australia: 
Economic Impacts of an Emissions Trading Scheme” in Dixon, 
P. B. and Jorgenson, D. W. Handbook of Computable General 
Equilibrium Modelling, North-Holland, Oxford, United Kingdom
[5] Mai Y., Peng, X. (2012), Estimating China’s rural labor surplus, 
Chinese Economy, 45(6): 38-59, November. DOI: 10.2753/
CES1097-1475450603
[6] Fang T., Ge Y. (2012), Unions and firm innovation in China: 
Synergy or strife? China Econ Rev, 23(1): 170-180
[7] Mai Y., Peng X., Dixon P. B., et al (2014), The economic effects 
of facilitating the flow of rural workers to urban employment in 
China, Papers in Regional Science, 93(3): 619-642, August
[8] Tyers R., Zhang Y. (2014), “Real exchange rate determination 
and the China puzzle”, forthcoming, Asian-Pacific Economic 
Literature, November
[9] Song L., Deer L. (2012), ‘China’s approach to rebalancing: a 
conceptual and policy framework’, China World Econ, 20 (1): 
1-26. DOI: 10.1111/j.1749-124X.2012.01270.x
[10] Dixon P. B., Parmenter B. R., Sutton J., et al (1982), ORANI: a 
multisector model of the Australian economy, North-Holland, 
Amsterdam
[11] Dixon P. B., Rimmer M. T. (2002), Dynamic general equilibrium 
modelling for forecasting and policy: a practical guide and 
documentation of MONASH, North-Holland Publishing 
Company, Amsterdam
[12] International Energy Agency (IEA) (2015) World energy outlook, 
IEA, Paris
[13] United Nations (UN) (2015), World Population Prospects: the 
2015 Revision, Population Division, United Nations, New 
Global Energy Interconnection Vol. 1 No. 4 Oct. 2018
442
York, USA
[14] World Bank (2014), Urban China – towards Efficient, Inclusive 
and Sustainable Urbanization, The World Bank and Development 
Research Centre of the State Council, The People’s Republic of 
China, Beijing, China
[15] United Nations (UN) (2018), World Urbanization Prospects: the 
2018 Revision, Population Division, United Nations, New York, 
USA
[16] Green F & Stern N (2015), China’s ‘new normal’: structural 
change, better growth, and peak emissions, Policy Brief, Centre 
for Climate Change Economies and Policy, and Grantham 
Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment
[17] Xinhuanet (2015), Enhanced Action on Climate Change: China’s 
Intended National Determined Contributions, http://www.
xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-06/30/c_134369837_2.htm
Biographies
Xiujian Peng received her Bachelor degree 
from Renmin (People’s) University of China 
in 1991 and Ph.D. degree from Monash 
University in 2005. From 1996 to 2001, 
she was a lecturer in the Department of 
Demography and Institute of Population 
Research, Renmin (People’s) University of 
China. Currently she is a Senior Research 
Fellow at Centre of Policy Studies, Victoria University. Her research 
interests include demographic economics, economic growth, labour 
market. She have authored more than thirty publications.
Philip D. Adams received his bachelor degree 
from Monash University in 1980 and Ph.D. 
degree from University of Melbourne in 1989.
Currently he is a research professor at the 
Centre of Policy Studies (CoPS), Victoria 
University, Melbourne, Australia. His main 
area of expertise is the application of large 
multi-sectoral and multi-regional economic 
models for policy analysis and forecasting. He has authored over 130 
papers since 1986. 
Jin Liu received her Bachelor degree from 
Beijing University of Economics, China in 
1982 and Master degree from Australian 
National University in 1991. She was a senior 
research fellow in Chinese Academy of Social 
Science. Currently she is an assistant director 
at Parliamentary Budget Office, Australia. 
Her research interests include economic 
growth, resource and energy economics, business taxation and labour 
market.
(Editor Zhou Zhou)
